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ABSTRACT 
Did Latin American privatisation polices fail because of flawed implementation 
of fundamentally sound policies or because privatisation policies were them 
selves seriously flawed? Using the Brazilian electric power reforms as a 
narrative tool, this paper examines the causal chain assumed by large-scale 
privatisation policies implemented as part of structural reform and adjustment 
programmes. The paper concludes that many privatisation policies and the 
economic stabilisation programmes within which they were embedded were 
not mutually reinforcing as policymakers had expected and that in their 
application, much of what privatisation theories claimed was lost in translation. 
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LOST IN TRANSLATION 
Interpreting the Brazilian Electric Power Privatisation Failure 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Like its neighbours Chile and Argentina, Brazil based its electric power reform 
on the orthodox therapies of privatisation and liberalisation. The Brazilian 
federal government initiated the reforms in 1993 and persevered with them 
until a lack of investment in generation led to a crippling energy crisis in 2001 
and forced the nation into rationing electricity. By the following year 
privatisation was politically dead. None of the major candidates in Brazil’s 2002 
presidential elections, not even the incumbent administration’s nominee, 
favoured continuing the process.  
In the wake of the rationing, blame was hurled in all directions. Some 
blamed the neo-liberal reforms for going too far;1 others for not going far 
enough.2 Some accused foreign investors of being overly speculative,3 while 
others criticised corporatist bureaucrats for resisting privatisation and 
liberalisation.4 Many faulted political impasses for stalling privatisation and 
investment.5 The more fatalist blamed the drought for drying up Brazil’s 
hydroelectric reservoirs. The debate on the failure of electric power reforms in 
Brazil, like the general debates on privatisation, had fallen into two well-
defined camps, with one camp claiming privatisation failed because it was 
poorly implemented and the other insisting that privatisation was a mistake. 
How does one arbitrate between these dichotomous explanations and 
should we try privatisation again? To answer this question, this paper analyses 
the Brazilian electric power reforms, a case which largely satisfies the criteria 
demanded of a critical case. Among all the Latin American countries, Brazil 
was one of the best placed to benefit from orthodox reforms. First, many 
Brazilian electricity companies, especially the generation companies, were 
technically well-managed even under state ownership. By enabling more 
supportive economic and commercial environments, orthodox reforms should 
have facilitated even more efficiency and investment. Second, electricity rates 
                                                 
1 See Ildo Sauer, Reconstrução do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro (São Paulo 2003) and Luiz 
Pinguelli, Diretrizes e Linhas de Ação Para o Setor Elétrico Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro 
2002) for arguments critical of the way the Brazilian power privatisation was 
conducted.  
2 José Claudio Linhares Pires, ‘As Perspectivas do Setor Elétrico Após o 
Racionamento’, BNDES Texto para Discussão, No. 97 (2002). 
3A. Biondi, O Brasil Privatizado: Um Balanço do Desmonte do Estado (São Paulo 
1999); J. Petras, J. and H. Veltmeyer, Cardoso’s Brazil: A Land for Sale (Lanham 
1999). 
4 Norman Gall, ‘Apagão Politica Energetica’, Braudel Papers No. 32 (São Paulo 2002). 
5 Peter Greiner, ‘Soluções ao Inves de mais Confução’, Braudel Papers No. 32. (São 
Paulo 2002) 
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in Brazil were never populist in the traditional sense. Cross-subsidies in the 
sector favoured large industrial consumers at the expense of residential ones. 
Populist political resistance to price rationalisation, which is one of the key 
barriers to implementing orthodox reform, was therefore unlikely. Third, the 
Brazilian federal government had already completed the basic and politically 
difficult reforms before initiating privatisation. Electricity rates had been raised 
and many of the state-owned electricity companies had begun streamlining 
their workforce, forcing thousands of employees into early retirement. Fourth, 
as Latin America’s biggest economy, Brazil enjoyed the investor interest which 
should have helped cement the orthodox reforms. Finally, the Brazilians had 
access to a wide range of experiences of power reform implemented in other 
countries from which to learn. Given these favourable factors, privatisation 
should have delivered immediate and self-reinforcing benefits. Instead, the 
programme was in shambles within five years. First, privatisation of power 
generation companies stalled. Then, the privatised distribution companies, 
because of their high levels of debt in foreign exchange, began to haemorrhage 
money following the devaluation of the Brazilian Real. Finally, the 
government’s attempts to induce private investment through independent 
power projects (IPPs) also failed.  
Were the Brazilian power reform failure an isolated disappointment 
amongst a series of successful privatisation initiatives in the region, it would 
still have been useful to study its experience given that the country’s power 
industry is the largest and most sophisticated in the region. However, the 
Brazilian experience is not unique and privatisation has become deeply 
unpopular throughout Latin America. Given that Brazil was more favourably 
placed to benefit from privatisation, understanding why the power reforms 
failed in Brazil has the potential to explain at a more fundamental level the 
general weaknesses in privatisation practice.  
2 BRAZILIAN POWER REFORMS: A BRIEF NARRATIVE 
Emphasizing the utility and importance of using narrative and stories to 
analyse and provide policy advice, John Forester evokes F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
dictum that “if he began with an individual, he soon had a type, but if he began 
with a type, he soon had nothing.”6 Following Fitzgerald’s dictum, this paper 
faithfully reproduces its inductive approach to the research and presents first 
the narrative basis of its analytic claims. While this section relates the story that 
inspired the research, those following analyse the failure of electric power 
reforms in Brazil in order to develop the general dynamics underpinning 
privatisation failures. 
                                                 
6 John Forester, ‘Policy Analysis and Planning: From Science to Argument’, in Frank 
Fischer and John Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning 
(Durham 1996).  
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Early Moves towards Privatisation in Brazil 
After an impressive performance in the post-War period, especially between 
1968 and 1973 when the economy grew at annual rates averaging 10 per cent, 
Brazil stalled, like many other developing countries, in the face of successive oil 
price and international lending rate shocks. The Brazilian military government’s 
inability to pull the country out of unrelenting stagflation transformed the 
country’s political and economic policy landscape in the 1980s. In a pattern 
which was repeated throughout the continent, Brazil’s entrepreneurial state and 
import-substitution policies lost credibility and economic policymaking was 
taken over by a new group of policy entrepreneurs that hewed to neoliberal 
ideas. Pointing to the highly-indebted and inefficient state-owned enterprises, 
they blamed state failure for stagnant growth and the nation’s debt problem 
and advocated a massive retrenchment of the state. 
In 1990, following its neighbours’ lead, Brazil embarked upon a 
comprehensive privatisation programme under the presidency of Fernando 
Collor de Mello. Collor had campaigned on a modernist platform of promoting 
private investment and public sector downsizing and to this end he 
immediately instituted a National Privatisation Programme (PND), an 
ambitious project pursuing privatisation on a sectoral basis and targeting 
traditionally state-owned firms such as large mineral and mining enterprises. 
His administration also wanted to privatise public utilities, especially in electric 
power and telecommunications, but the 1988 Brazilian Constitution forbade 
private provision of infrastructure services. While his administration was trying 
to navigate through this constitutional impediment, Collor was impeached on 
corruption charges in 1992. 
Under Collor’s Vice President and successor Itamar Franco, the 
Brazilian Congress passed critical pieces of legislation that paved the way for 
the institutional reform and financial recovery of the electric power industry. 
Law 8,643/93 eliminated the uniform national electricity rate and did away 
with the legally guaranteed but rarely honoured 10 per cent rate of return 
established by the 1934 Water Code. Instead, it allowed a substantial increase 
in electricity rates to reflect the power companies’ operational costs as well as 
to provide an adequate return on capital. More importantly for subsequent 
privatisation, the law cleaned up the power companies’ books by having the 
Treasury assume US$ 26 billion of their debts. Resolution 1,063/93 initiated 
market liberalisation by allowing large energy-intensive customers to negotiate 
electricity rates directly with utilities. Decree 1009/93, which created the 
national electricity transmission system (SINTREL), enabled free access to the 
federal transmission network thereby facilitating, theoretically and legally, 
competition in the generation sector. These laws collectively laid the 
foundation to modernising the institutional relationships in the electricity 
sector and putting it back on a sound commercial footing. Franco, however, 
made no effort to privatise power companies. He was not a reformer in the 
neoliberal mould nor was he sympathetic to foreign capital. Nevertheless, in 
response to these initial reforms, power companies began to recover financially 
and also to increase their operational efficiencies. 
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Macroeconomic Stability and the Mandate for Privatisation 
The economic stabilisation plans Franco inherited from Collor were, however, 
failing: Inflation was still running at between 25 per cent and 30 per cent a 
month, the operational deficit hovered around 2.5 per cent of GDP, and real 
GDP was falling. With these problems plaguing his administration, Franco 
went through three finance ministers, at the rate of about one every two 
months, before finally appointing Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the 
post in May 1993. 
As Finance Minister, Cardoso began with some immediate fiscal cuts 
and then focused on monetary stability. After attempting but generally failing 
to cut federal and state expenditures swiftly and sufficiently, Cardoso 
introduced the Real Plan. Similar to the Argentine Law of Convertibility, this 
plan first created an index pegged one-to-one with the US dollar and then, in 
July 1994, introduced a new currency, the Real, based on this indexer. The Real 
Plan worked: Almost immediately inflation fell from a monthly rate that 
exceeded 50 per cent to less than 1 per cent.  
The Real Plan succeeded in controlling inflation because it appeared to 
be a visible and credible commitment to monetary and, by extension, fiscal 
responsibility and it unleashed the virtuous cycle of stability and growth which 
the orthodoxy had been predicting: Monetary stability stimulated pent-up 
demand and industrial production, which led to growth rates exceeding 5 per 
cent in the latter half of 1994.7 
In response to the improving economic climate, the mandate for 
neoliberal reform and privatisation became clear. Six months before the 
presidential elections in October 1994, Cardoso was trailing the Workers 
Party’s candidate, Lula da Silva by 17 per cent to 41 per cent in terms of voting 
intentions but the success of the Real Plan propelled Cardoso to the 
Presidency.8 Having defeated inflation and established a strong currency, 
Cardoso had both the desire and the political capital to push through the 
constitutional amendments and the new laws required to privatise Brazil’s 
public utilities. In his first year in office, Congress passed the Concessions Law 
(Law 8,987/95), which opened public utility services to competitive auctions in 
which private investors could participate and Law 9,074/95, which established 
the procedures for conducting public bidding and the designation of IPPs to 
supply power to large non-captive consumers.9  With the legal groundwork 
laid, electricity privatisation quickly followed.  
                                                 
7 Edmund Amann and Werner Baer, ‘The Illusion of Stability: The Brazilian Economy 
under Cardoso’, World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10 (2000), pp. 1805-; Baer, The 
Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. 5th Edition (Westport 2001). 
8 M. Coimbra, ‘As Batalhas de Itararé’, Carta Capital, Vol.13, No.409 (2006), pp. 38-39. 
9 Concessions were for 30 years for distribution and transmission companies and 35 
years for generation companies. 
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Electric Power Privatisation under the Real Plan 
On the 21 May 1996, after months of preparation and intense negotiation, a 
majority stake in Light, the electricity distribution company for the city of Rio 
de Janeiro, was sold to a consortium of European and American investors for 
US$ 2.3 billion. It was, at the time, one of the largest privatisation sales in Latin 
America and it heralded the beginning of Brazil’s massive infrastructure 
privatisation programme, one which would eventually bring in over US$ 100 
billion in revenue for the federal and state governments. 
Power Privatisation: Strategy and Structure 
As conceived by the Cardoso administration, the privatisation and 
restructuring of the electricity industry was to be done in two phases. 
Distribution companies (DISCOS) were to be privatised in the first phase 
followed by the generation companies (GENCOS) in the second phase. This 
did not require much restructuring because the Brazilian electricity industry 
was for most parts already vertically separated. Only the state governments of 
São Paulo, Parana, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul owned vertically 
integrated generation-cum-distribution companies. The rest of the generation 
and transmission infrastructure was owned by federal GENCOS under its 
holding company Eletrobrás while the DISCOS were owned by their 
respective state governments.10 
The decision to privatise distribution before generation was unusual. 
The most pressing investment requirements are usually in generation. In Brazil 
too, when the privatisation process had begun in 1995, Eletrobrás had 
estimated that the power sector would require between US$ 8.2 to US$ 13.2 
billion in annual investment (depending on the actual rates of economic 
growth) over the following decade and of this amount generation would 
require over 50 per cent of the total investment, transmission would require 
about 34 per cent and distribution about 14 per cent.11 Notwithstanding this, 
the Cardoso administration preferred privatising DISCOS first because it 
distrusted state governments’ fiscal attitudes. In the past, state-owned banks 
liberally made massive loans to their state governments and the Brazilian 
                                                 
10 A few years after the nationalisation of the American & Foreign Power Company 
(AMFORP), one of the two main foreign electricity groups in Brazil, Eletrobrás 
transferred AMFORP’s distribution assets to their respective state governments. One 
exception was Escelsa, the DISCO for the state of Espirito Santo, which refused to 
take over the company. The other exception was the DISCO for the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, Light, which remained with Eletrobrás following the nationalisation of the 
Brazilian Power Traction and Light Company in 1979.  These two DISCOS were the 
first power companies to be privatised.  
11 Eletrobrás, O Planajamento da Expansão do Setor de Energia Elétrica: A Atuação da 
Eletrobrás e do Grupo Goordenador do Planejamento dos Sistemas Elétricos (GCPS), (Rio de 
Janeiro 2002). 
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Central Bank was forced to bail them out when the latter defaulted. To tackle 
this problem, Cardoso pressured state governments to privatise their banks. 
Similarly, state-owned DISCOS regularly defaulted on payments for wholesale 
power to the federal GENCOS, which could hardly turn off power supply to 
entire cities or states in retaliation. For this reason, the Cardoso administration 
wanted to separate state governments from their DISCOS. Arguing that 
private investors in generation would in any case want federal guarantees 
against the risk that state-owned DISCOS might again default on their 
payments for wholesale power, the Cardoso administration proceeded to 
privatise them first. 
The strategy to privatise DISCOS first corresponded with another 
administration priority which was to begin privatisation as soon as possible in 
order to take advantage of the favourable international investment climate and 
their immediate post-election popularity wave. GENCO privatisation would 
have been slower, requiring time to design the proposed wholesale power 
market and to set up the institutions needed to regulate the sector and to 
establish water-use charges, which was important given that over 90 per cent 
of Brazil's electricity was produced by large multi-purpose hydro projects. The 
administration reasoned that the market rules and the other necessary 
institutional infrastructure could be created while the DISCOS were being 
privatised. Indeed, when DISCO privatisation commenced, the power sector 
still lacked an independent regulatory authority but the administration had 
decided that the terms of service could be written into the DISCOS’ 
concession contracts and would suffice until the regulatory agency could be 
established. 
Regulation and Market Structure 
Distribution companies were auctioned under a 30-year concession basis. Their 
regulation followed the well-established British model of price-cap regulation, 
which was applied to costs directly under the control of the DISCO, while 
other costs such as that of wholesale power purchases and taxes and 
surcharges were to be automatically passed through to retail tariffs. The 
wholesale power purchases were subject to a pass-through price ceiling called 
the Valor Normativo (VN), which was essentially the maximum price at which 
DISCOS could acquire power. Initially, the VN was standard for all types of 
power; later it was differentiated according to the source of the power with 
hydropower being priced lowest and alternative forms such as wind and solar 
enjoying a higher VN. The concessions contracts also allowed DISCOS to self-
supply up to 35 per cent of their total wholesale power requirements.  This was 
done partly to make the concessions more attractive to investors. More 
importantly, since power supplies were already stretched thin and GENCO 
privatisation would take time, the administration wanted to create a space for 
immediate private investment in generation. 
At this stage a competitive wholesale power market had not yet been 
established. GENCOS supplied power to DISCOS at prices administered by 
the federal government. This system was later formalised in 1998 when the 
federal government mediated the signing of initial power purchase contracts 
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among DISCOS and GENCOS, which locked in the price of wholesale power 
for eight years (adjusted annually for inflation). After the first four years, a 
quarter of the total volume of the electricity initially contracted was supposed 
to be released every year so that at the end of the eight years a fully functioning 
and competitive wholesale power market would be established. During this 
period the administration expected to privatise generation and to further 
liberalise retail markets. 
The Collapse of Generation Privatisation and the Road to 
Rationing 
DISCO privatisation proceeded relatively smoothly even though it began in the 
absence of the supporting institutional infrastructure. However, the size and 
complexity of the Brazilian power industry—consisting of 64 DISCOS, 20 
transmission companies and 15 GENCOS—meant that privatising generation 
would take time. In fact, it took over a year after privatisation began to 
establish the electric power regulatory agency (ANEEL) and it was not until 
May 1998, almost three years after DISCO privatisation had commenced, that 
the Brazilian Congress passed legislation enabling GENCO privatisation.  
By this time the Asian and Russian financial crises had derailed the Real 
Plan. The currency peg was abandoned in January 1999 and the Real’s value 
quickly dropped in half, trading at over R$ 2 to the dollar. The privatised 
DISCOS began to suffer large losses because of their high levels of hard 
currency debt and clamoured for rate relief. Although the electricity rate 
increases subsequently allowed by ANEEL outpaced inflation rates, this was 
not sufficient to compensate investors for the losses they suffered in the 
currency markets. Not surprisingly, in this economically chaotic environment 
the privatisation of GENCOS and the large state-owned vertically integrated 
companies such as Copel and Cemig stalled as a result of investor disinterest 
and increasing domestic opposition. When the federal government put up the 
smallest of its GENCOS, Eletrosul, for sale, it received only one bid at the 
minimum reserve price. 
Despite the evident paralysis in power privatisation, the Cardoso 
administration did not allow the federal GENCOS to ramp up their 
investments even though they were financially able to do so. Instead, in 
February 2000, the administration launched a Priority Thermoelectric Power 
Programme (PPT) through which it intended to channel funds from the 
national development bank (BNDES) to private investors in order to induce 
them to build a projected 49 new thermoelectric power plants totalling over 18 
GW of installed capacity. BNDES offered to finance up to 80 per cent of the 
project costs but private investors remained averse in spite of this incentive. 
With the government’s policy floundering, the administration finally asked 
Petrobrás, Brazil’s massive state-owned oil company, to step in and take charge 
of 15 projects. However, by the time Petrobrás began to construct the plants it 
was too late and in May 2001, warned by the Brazilian National Electricity 
Systems Operator (ONS) that the hydroelectric reservoirs in most of the 
country were practically depleted; Cardoso was forced to declare an emergency 
electricity rationing. All except the smallest residential customers were 
instructed to reduce their consumption by at least 20 per cent, failing which 
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they would be fined or even disconnected. The rationing lasted 10 months and 
cost the industry at least US$ 5 billion in lost revenue. Estimates of the loss in 
GDP caused by electricity rationing vary between 1.5 and 2 per cent, which 
indicates a further loss of about US$ 10 billion to the Brazilian economy. 
3. POLICY SYMBIOSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL 
AND STRATEGIC UNDERPINNINGS OF MACROECONOMIC 
STABILISATION AND PRIVATISATION POLICIES IN BRAZIL 
In the initial years, the Brazilian power privatisation programme was a 
resounding success. By late 1997, almost all the major DISCOS had been 
privatised with most of them fetching handsome premiums over their 
minimum reserve prices (see Table 1, page 13). In fact, on a per-MW basis, 
Brazilian DISCOS generally commanded a much higher price than DISCOS in 
other Latin American countries. As a result of this frenetic pace of selling 
Brazil, which before 1995 had privatised little, became the largest recipient of 
privatisation revenues in Latin America.  
In hindsight, the fact that investors bid so high might be considered 
curious or surprising, especially if we consider that in the initial stages an 
independent regulatory agency that would protect investor interests did not 
exist. DISCOS were sold with only their concessions contracts, which were not 
comprehensive and left unaddressed many critical issues such as what would 
be the basis for the periodic rate revisions.  In addition, significant risks such as 
those related to exchange rates remained with the investors. Nor were there 
any clear policy directives on the future industrial structure, other than vague 
government commitments to further privatisation and liberalisation.  
If privatisation could generate early successes even within this 
ambiguous policy environment, why was the Cardoso administration unable to 
sustain its power reforms programme? 
Manufacturing Privatisation Successes 
The early successes of the Brazilian power reforms programme can be 
attributed to a generalised enthusiasm about the prospects for high levels of 
profits to be made from international infrastructure investments. While the 
lack of institutional clarity and maturity in the re-organised infrastructure 
sectors did increase uncertainty for investors, this was adequately compensated 
for by the potentially high levels of returns that the developing country 
governments were in those days willing to allow investors. In Brazil, the 
Cardoso administration’s underlying assumption, which was borne out by the 
high privatisation prices, was that investor interest in the initial stages of 
privatisation had little to do with the state of the institutional infrastructure of 
the sector and much to do with the perceptions of the government’s policy 
orientation. Favourable perceptions of the government’s policy orientation 
were created through initial concessions contracts and pricing policies that 
were very advantageous to private investors.  
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Table 1 
Privatisation Prices and Premiums Paid for Brazilian DISCOS 
 
Source: BNDES 
 
Distribution margins—which are generally to the order of 40 per cent of final 
rates—were increased so that they ended up representing 60 per cent of the 
final rates. Retail electricity prices rose substantially right away but wholesale 
(that is, generation) prices, because they accrued to federal GENCOS which 
were not yet slated for privatisation, lagged behind.  
 Value 
of Sale 
(US$ 
million) 
Premium (%) 
Paid of 
Minimum 
Reserve 
Price 
% of Total 
Capital 
Bought 
Sales 
(GWh/year) 
Winning 
Consortium 
Ecselsa 385 11.78 50.00 5,487 Iven and GTD 
(Brazil) 
Light 2,217 - 54.00 21,689 EDF (France) 
AES (USA) 
Houston (USA) 
Cerj 588 30.27 70.26 5,733 Chilectra/Enersis 
(Chile) 
EDP (Portugal) 
Coelba 1,602 77.38 62.54 7,985 Iberdrola (Spain) 
Previ (Brazil) 
CEEE 
(Centre-West) 
1,372 93.55 90.91 5,772 AES (USA) 
CEEE (North-
Northeast) 
1,487 82.62 90.75 4,611 VBC (Brazil) 
CEA (USA) 
Previ (Brazil) 
CPFL 2,741 70.15 41.06 16,704 VBC (Brazil) 
Bonnaire (Brazil) 
Enersul 568 83.79 48.67 2,513 Ecselsa 
Cemat 356 21.09 86.91 2,139 Grupo 
Rede/Inepar 
(Brazil) 
Energipe 525 96.05 86.42 
 
1,492 Cataguases-
Leopoldina 
(Brazil) 
CMS (USA) 
Cosern 616 73.90 85.75 2,084 Iberdrola (Spain) 
Previ (Brazil) 
Coelce 868 27.20 53.11 4,778 Enersis (Chile) 
Endesa (Spain) 
Eletropaulo 
Metropolitana 
1,776 - 29.80 34,779 EDF/AES/Housto
n 
 
Celpa 388 - 51.26 3,014 Grupo 
Rede/Inepar 
(Brazil) 
Elektro 1,273 98.90 46.62 10,295 Enron Brazil 
Power Holding 
Eletropaulo 
Bandeirante 
860 - 29.80 23,170 CPFL/EDP 
 14
As a result of favourable policies, in the first two years after 
privatisation DISCO profits rose from about US$ 100 million to about US$ 2 
billion. Note that this increased profitability cannot be attributed to increasing 
efficiencies resulting from privatisation because by 1996 only three DISCOS 
had been privatised and their combined profits added up to only US$ 115 
million.12 DISCO profitability was thus increased before privatisation. In 
addition, several potential profit making opportunities were built into the 
concessions contracts: DISCOS were allowed to self-supply up to 35 per cent 
of their power requirements; they were allowed to explore related commercial 
opportunities, such as in internet and telecommunications, which would be 
outside the concessions contracts’ regulatory purview; almost no minimum 
investment or service expansions conditions were imposed upon them; and 
despite being regulated by the RPI-X model, the X factor was set at 0 for the 
initial five years, thereby allowing them to appropriate all benefits arising from 
efficiency improvements. 
Gambling with the Security of Supply  
Even as the Brazilian electric power privatisation programme initially appeared 
to be delivering success after success, the security of electricity supply in Brazil 
was being steadily compromised. The electricity supply situation was already 
critical when power privatisation began in late 1995. In addition, electricity 
demand accelerated after the Real Plan because monetary stability had 
stimulated consumer demand and industrial production. Consequently, the 
power supply markets became even tighter. In the three years after 
privatisation, which began when the power supply situation was already grave, 
power consumption increased by over 15 per cent but installed capacity 
increases trailed behind at 10 per cent (see Figure 1). These were not the only 
evidence of the deterioration in the security of electricity supply in Brazil. As 
early as 1996, a BNDES study indicated that Brazil faced an elevated risk of 
rationing after 2000 and even the consultants contracted by the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy to advise on the privatisation and the restructuring of the 
industry warned that Brazil would face an elevated risk of rationing if 
generation investment suffered any delays.13 Nevertheless, shortly after 
initiating DISCO privatisation, the Cardoso administration began to enter the 
Eletrobrás GENCOS into the PND, drastically curtailing their investment 
programmes and withdrawing many concessions to develop hydropower sites 
which had been awarded to the GENCOS. The consequent deterioration in 
the security of supply was evidenced by the fact that in each year following 
1996 the levels of the hydropower reservoirs were always less than those in the 
corresponding period in the preceding year (see Figure 2). In other words, the 
                                                 
12 See A. Mendonça and C. Dahl, ‘The Brazilian Electrical System Reform’, Energy 
Policy, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1999), pp. 73-83; and BNDES, Cadernos  de Infra-estrutura: Setor 
Elétrico – Perfil das Concessionárias, Vol. 2  (Rio de Janeiro 2001).  
13 Coopers and Lybrand, Projeto de Restruturação do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro. 
Relatorio Consolidado Etapa IV-I (1997). 
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reserve stock of water, necessary to guarantee the security of electricity supply 
in an industry in which hydropower supplied over 90 per cent of electricity 
requirements, was steadily being depleted.14 
Figure 1 
Electricity Consumption and Installed Capacity Changes (1981-2000) 
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Source: Eletrobrás 
 
                                                 
14 Brazil’s hydropower reservoirs are fed by seasonal rainfall, being depleted during the 
summer and recharged during the winter. Rainfall in Brazil is quite erratic and it is not 
uncommon to have several consecutive years of below-average rainfall. Consequently, 
Brazilian electricity planners deliberately constructed large reservoirs so that there 
would be enough water stored to carry the system through the dry years. Charts 
prepared by Eletrobrás indicate that since 1996 these reservoirs were being 
progressively depleted of their reserve storage capacities. While it was not a simple 
task to determine what level of reserve storage is adequate given that predicting 
rainfall years in advance is impossible, Eletrobrás’ research lab CEPEL had overcome 
this problem by developing a sophisticated probabilistic stochastic computational 
programme called NEWAVE to determine whether existing reservoir capacities are 
adequate or if new power generation facilities are needed. NEWAVE calculates the 
possible electricity production capabilities under 2,000 different rainfall scenarios and 
installed capacity is considered inadequate if expected demand would not be satisfied 
in more than 5 per cent of the scenarios. After 1995, this threshold safety margin of 5 
per cent began to be breached and the number of scenarios predicting a risk of 
rationing began to approach 20 per cent. The figures on the risk of rationing were 
published by various sources including Eletrobrás and were widely available.  
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Public power investment was frozen not, as is commonly believed and 
as the Cardoso administration repeatedly tried to point out, because of a lack 
of public financial resources. The initial power industry reforms of 1993 had 
set the stage for the recuperation of the financial health of the GENCOS (see 
Figure 3). Given its debt levels and projected cash flows at that point in time, 
Eletrobrás could have invested up to US$ 7 billion per annum. Instead, 
because of restrictions imposed by the federal government, Eletrobrás 
investments were less than US$ 3 billion per annum during this period.  
Figure 2 
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It also cannot be argued that public investments were frozen because 
the slack was being taken up by private investors. GENCO privatisation was 
not scheduled to begin until after DISCO privatisation was almost completed 
and given Brazil’s size and the sheer number of DISCOS involved, this would 
obviously take time.  
A plausible hypothesis is that curbs on the Eletrobrás companies’ 
investment programmes were retained in order to increase the sales prices of 
the GENCOS by providing them with a clean balance sheet. Given that the 
hydroelectric system could be stretched for a few years because of the reservoir 
balances which had been maintained, the administration applied GENCOS’ 
increasing revenues to paying down their debts instead of amplifying their 
investment programmes. Between 1995 and 1997, Furnas’ debt was more than 
halved, from R$ 5.65 billion to R$ 2.72 billion. Eletrosul’s debt reduction was 
even more dramatic: in two years it slashed its debt 80 per cent, from R$ 1.45 
billion to R$ 300 million. The downside was that excessively depleting 
 17
reservoirs in order to postpone investments and improve the GENCOS’ 
balance sheets was running down the capacity of the system to deal with 
extended dry weather periods. 
Figure 3 
Brazilian Generation Company Profits (1994-1998) 
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There were other indications that public investments in electric power 
generation were not limited because of the government’s financial constraints. 
Despite an outward determination to withdraw the government from the 
power sector, the Cardoso administration actively employed state resources to 
ensure high levels of “private” investment. Almost throughout the privatisation 
process, BNDES made low-interest loans available to potential (mostly 
foreign) investors for up to 50 per cent of the reserve price.15 In some cases, 
BNDES even took equity positions in the privatised enterprises. Initially, 
BNDES had intended to finance the privatisation of only those firms which 
were in relatively unattractive markets such as in the smaller states in Brazil’s 
poorer northeast. In the end, under pressure from the Cardoso administration, 
these loans were extended for the privatisation of all power companies. 
BNDES was not the only source of public money being provided to private 
investors in the power industry. In several subsequent sales, funds originating 
from other federal entities, such as Previ (Banco do Brasil’s workers’ pension 
fund, which is one of the largest in the country) figured prominently in the 
investor consortia. For example, a consortium headed by Spain’s Ibredrola 
bought Coelba, Bahia’s DISCO, but Banco do Brasil and Previ’s shares in this 
                                                 
15 This policy of providing BNDES financing to foreign investors was fairly 
controversial and severely criticized by some segments of policy and popular opinion 
in Brazil. 
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consortium were almost the same as Iberdrola’s. In all of these cases the 
administration applied pressure on government-owned financial institutions to 
invest in privatisation and the objective was to increase the sales prices of these 
firms. This view is supported by public statements made by senior BNDES 
executives where they confirm that BNDES funding was vital to ensuring that 
power company privatisation fetched high prices. 
Policy Symbiosis: The Self-Reinforcing Virtuous Cycle of 
Stabilisation and Privatisation 
If the need for investment was the publicly-stated reason for privatisation, then 
why did the Cardoso administration use BNDES and other funds controlled 
by the state to promote privatisation at higher sale prices and not investment in 
new electric power infrastructure? (We cannot consider revenues from 
privatisation as an indication of investment in the power sector since it signifies 
merely a transfer in the ownership of assets rather than true investment in the 
form of the creation of  new productive  assets). One could argue that 
increasing the sales prices of DISCOS was not the main purpose of extending 
BNDES loans by claiming that lowering the cost of capital would provide 
incentives for larger investments in new infrastructure. The theory behind 
competitive auctions would, however, insist that any lowering of the cost of 
capital would automatically translate into a higher willingness-to-pay for the 
firm. Consequently, as BNDES financing implicitly reduced the buyer’s cost of 
capital, it inflated the nominal value of the firm. If privatisation was intended 
to bring in foreign and private investment, then BNDES financing was 
counter-productive in that it had a substitutive rather than complementary 
effect. 
From the administration’s point of view, the desire to focus on 
privatisation revenues especially through the application of federally-controlled 
financial resources has to be understood by examining the political and 
economic context within which privatisation was being conducted. As Finance 
Minister, Cardoso’s principal preoccupation was to deal with hyperinflation, 
which he had beaten. As President, Cardoso had inherited a massive debt 
burden which continued to threaten the precarious stability established by the 
Real Plan, the preservation of which was the basis of his administration’s 
economic programme.  
Brazil’s fundamental economic problem as diagnosed by the Cardoso 
administration along the then-popular neo-liberal lines was that the economic 
policies of the entrepreneurial state had led to a massive increase in public 
sector debt which in turn had led to high rates of inflation, exchange rate 
instability and ultimately, low economic growth. Furthermore, given the 
government’s debt problems, state ownership in critical sectors such as electric 
power and telecommunications had led to insufficient public investment and 
precluded private investment. With insufficient investment, public services 
were inadequately and inefficiently provided, thereby further dampening 
economic growth. The solution was privatisation. It would establish a virtuous 
self-reinforcing cycle of efficiency and growth by reducing the public debt, 
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thereby contributing to monetary and exchange rate stability which, in turn, 
would attract investment. 
Brazil’s own experience and those of other countries had shown that a 
degree of economic stability was a prerequisite to attracting investor interest. 
Under Collor, privatisation had not clearly articulated with a macro 
stabilisation policy; at most, his administration had linked privatisation to debt 
reduction and his PND had limited the scope of foreign investment. In reality, 
given the economic instability, foreign interest in acquiring Brazilian assets was 
low and foreign investors purchased only 5 per cent of the assets sold under 
Collor’s privatisation programme.16 Foreign investment was, however, essential 
in promoting stability because it was needed to prop up the value of the 
domestic currency. In order to attract this stability-inducing investment, an 
autonomous stabilisation plan, such as the Real Plan, would have to be 
introduced first in order to break the cycle of inflation and exchange rate 
volatility and provide macroeconomic stability. This would, in turn, attract 
foreign investors, which was essential for the longer term sustenance of the 
stabilisation plan. Thus, in contrast to Collor’s privatisation plans, Cardoso’s 
privatisation strategy placed much fewer restrictions on foreign capital and it 
wanted foreign investors to take majority positions in the privatised companies. 
Not surprisingly, Brazilian-led investor groups rarely won the auctions for the 
large DISCOS that were initially privatised (see Table 1).  
Amann and Baer (2000) have shown that the stability provided by this 
approach was bought at the cost of an overvalued Real, which was the main 
instrument used to control inflation.17 This had several negative repercussions 
on the Brazilian economy. To maintain an overvalued Real the government 
had to offer extremely high interest rates. This worsened the fiscal situation as 
it pushed up debt service payments, which added up to 13 per cent of GDP or 
about 40 per cent of total tax revenues. Exports also suffered as the overvalued 
Real made domestic producers less competitive and, for the first time in 
several decades, Brazil became a net importer. 
The operating assumption that justified the costs of maintaining this 
stability was that these up-front expenses would be rewarded by higher growth 
rates which would eventually reduce fiscal deficits by increasing tax revenues 
and lowering public expenditures. A dynamic and growing economy would in 
turn provide more profit-making opportunities to foreign investors, thereby 
reducing over time the risk premium that they were demanding.  
                                                 
16 See Armando Castelar Pinheiro and Fabio Giambiagi, ‘Brazilian Privatization in the 
1990s’, World Development, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1994), pp. 737-53. 
17 See Amann and Baer, ‘The Illusion of Stability: The Brazilian Economy under 
Cardoso’. According to the authors trade liberalisation via the reduction of tariffs also 
helped control inflation as cheaper imports (given the overvalued Real) either 
displaced domestic producers or prevented them from raising their prices. Their 
claims are backed and extended by George E. Schambaugh, ‘The Power of Money: 
Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries’, American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2004), pp. 281-95, who finds that fixed exchange rate regimes 
tend to overvalue and appreciate the domestic currency. 
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In order for this strategy to work, it was essential to maintain the 
monetary stability of the Real Plan till such time as economic growth 
consolidated itself in Brazil. Privatisation served to maintain stability in three 
ways. First, the administration expected Brazil’s massive infrastructure firms—
primarily in electric power and telecommunications—to fetch tens of billions 
of dollars. They expected this influx of foreign exchange to increase demand 
for the Real and keep its value vis-à-vis the dollar stable. The resulting 
monetary stability itself would reinforce investor confidence, thereby pushing 
privatisation prices even higher. Second, privatisation would provide 
immediate funds to help pay for a large one-time reduction in the federal debt. 
Third, it would fiscally discipline the federal and, more importantly, state 
governments by selling the institutions, such as state-owned banks and power 
companies, that had facilitated fiscal indiscipline. Removal of investment 
responsibility in these sectors from the state would also lower the public sector 
borrowing requirements (PSBR), which was expected to further increase 
investor confidence.  
Privatisation and the Real Plan were thus symbiotic. Given the 
operating strategy of the Real Plan, the use of state-controlled resources such 
as BNDES funds to help inflate sales prices was logical from the 
macroeconomic perspective. Such injections were necessary to ensure the 
economic stability that would buy credibility for the government’s reform 
plans. While the Cardoso administration did prioritise macroeconomic 
imperatives over electricity sector needs, they did not view the two as 
necessarily antagonistic. They expected that because of macroeconomic 
stability the privatisation of DISCOS and then GENCOS would proceed 
smoothly, that the newly established electric power regulatory body would be 
able to control excessive profit-seeking yet allow enough returns so that the 
private investors would bring in new investment, technologies and efficiencies, 
and consequently, that consumers would enjoy good service at appropriate 
prices. In short, they expected privatisation to initiate a virtuous cycle of 
investment, good service, profit and reinvestment. 
4. FROM THE VIRTUOUS TO THE VICIOUS CYCLE 
On theoretical grounds, it did not appear that the Cardoso administration’s 
reasoning or strategy was flawed. In addition to the standard criticisms of 
public ownership on agency, property rights and public choice grounds, the 
efficiency claims of privatisation rested largely on the beneficial effects of 
competition, with which it is usually associated. Even in monopolistic markets, 
some forms of competition are possible with privatisation, for example, if not 
in the market, then for the market. This latter kind of competition was 
employed in privatising DISCOS in Brazil. Even though DISCOS were 
auctioned as monopolies, the theoretical assumption was that each investor 
would compete to win the concession, bidding the maximum amount that 
would still allow him/her to make his/her minimum required rates of return 
on capital. The theory predicted that the most efficient investors would win 
such auctions since they would be the ones who would stand to make the 
largest operational profits at any given level of regulated rates. It followed that 
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both governments and consumers should benefit from such transactions: The 
former should be able to capture the full value for their assets (and apply it 
towards debt reduction) whereas the latter should continually benefit because 
real rates should progressively fall in response to the regulators’ judicious 
setting of X factors under price-cap regulation. Even though the Brazilian 
power reforms were geared more towards sustaining macroeconomic stability 
and did not directly provide incentives for investment in new power 
infrastructure, most privatisation analyses predicted that getting the 
fundamentals right, opening the sector to private investors and allowing 
markets to operate would automatically ensure adequate investment and 
appropriate prices. 
The On-going Price Effects of Privatisation 
The first indications that power reforms in Brazil were diverging from the 
expected causal chain were provided by post-privatisation trends in electricity 
rates. We can assume given the frenetic competition and the premiums paid 
that electricity rates at the time of privatisation were, if not generous, sufficient 
to attract private investment in the sector and that given that price-cap 
regulation was in force, retail electricity rates would fall in real terms over the 
years. However, a study of Brazilian retail electricity rates reveals that they have 
been increasing since 1995 (see Figure 4). Between 1995 and 2001, average 
electricity rates increased by 106.24 per cent while the IGP-M price index that 
was being used to correct electricity prices for inflation increased by only 66.82 
per cent.18 If privatised power companies are supposed to become continually 
more efficient, then it appears contradictory that real distribution rates should 
increase. 
Potential explanations for these unexpected results are indicated by 
empirical investigations of investor behaviour, which reveal many deviations 
from the (virtuous) chain of causality which theory predicted would accrue to 
privatisation. It has been observed that firms which win auctions are not 
necessarily the most efficient, just the most optimistic.19 To some extent this 
optimism may stem from investor beliefs that they are more efficient than they 
really are but to a larger extent a different dynamic prevails in the case of 
developing countries. Here, governments and regulation are viewed as more 
malleable to foreign investor pressure and investors may bid high just to make 
                                                 
18 The IGP-M, which combines wholesale as well as retail price indices, is one of 
several inflation indexes used in Brazil. It is calculated by the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, an independent private university and think-tank in Brazil.  
19E. Capen, R. Clapp and W. Campbell, ‘Competitive Bidding in High Risk Situations’, 
Journal of Petroleum Technology Vol.23 (1971), pp. 641-653 as cited in J. Linhares Pires 
and F. Giambiagi, ‘Retorno dos Novos Investimentos Privados em Contexto de 
Incerteza: Uma Proposta de Mudança do Mechanismo de Concessão de Rodovias no 
Brasil’, BNDES Texto para Discussão No. 81. (2002). 
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sure they win the auction because they expect to be able to renegotiate better 
contract terms in the immediate future.20  
Figure 4 
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Where competitive forces are minimal or absent, this dynamic may 
have severe repercussions. In competitive industries, even if investors 
overspend on acquiring an asset, consumers may not suffer because 
competitive pressures might prevent one firm from passing on the costs of its 
mistake. In regulated industries, prices are administratively established and are 
based on an implicit or explicit guarantee to provide investors an adequate rate 
of return on capital. This causes a circularity problem whereby the more an 
investor pays for an asset, the more the pressure will be on regulators to allow 
higher rates, especially in developing countries where regulatory institutions are 
nascent and weak and where governments are keen to attract further 
                                                 
20 This dynamic is borne out by empirical studies which show that almost half of all 
infrastructure concessions contracts are renegotiated within the first two years, almost 
always in favour of the investors. See J. Guasch, ‘Granting and Renegotiating 
Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right’, World Bank Institute of Development 
Studies (2004). One classic example of renegotiation is the case of the water 
concession in Buenos Aires. Shortly after the concession was awarded based on the 
minimum tariff that the investor would charge to provide services under a given set of 
contractual conditions, the contract was renegotiated at a tariff that significantly 
exceeded the next best offer. 
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investment.21 Consequently, contrary to what the privatisation policy assumed, 
in most regulated infrastructures where there is limited competition, prices did 
not go through only a one-time correction at the moment of privatisation but 
displayed a consistent upward trend. 
Internal Contradictions in Privatisation and Investment Plans 
The second and more serious indication that power reforms had deviated from 
the virtuous causal chain came from electric power investment trends: 
Although electric power investment had picked up after 1995, by 1998 it was 
still below pre-reform 1993 levels (see Figure 5).  
Why did the power reforms not lead to the expected spurt in 
investment? Partly, the sums being invested in the Brazilian power sector were 
being used to purchase existing assets rather than create new ones. More 
importantly, serious distortions were appearing in the financial dynamics of the 
power sector given the Cardoso administration’s strategy of making DISCOS 
as attractive as possible to investors.  
Figure 5 
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21 See Mark Armstrong, Samuel Cowan and John Vickers, Regulatory Reform: Economic 
Analysis and the British Experience, (Cambridge 1994) for an in-depth explanation of the 
circularity problem. 
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Viewed in isolation, the Cardoso administration’s decision to increase 
distribution margins and retail rates was undesirable but not sufficient to cause 
a general crisis in the industry. In combination with the macroeconomic 
constraints then prevailing, it was unworkable. Up to a point, the Cardoso 
administration could allow electricity rates to rise, gambling that as in the case 
of the Real Plan economic growth would bring the overall as well as the power 
sector economy back into equilibrium. It was, however, a risky venture. Given 
that electricity is a basic input into most economic activities, the administration 
could not raise power rates beyond a certain point without creating inflationary 
pressures, which was what the Cardoso administration’s economic policies 
were focussed on.  
Given the immediate need to allow investors high returns while at the 
same time not allowing retail rates to increase even more dramatically, the 
government squeezed generation margins. Since the GENCOS were still 
federally owned, the government was able to adopt this strategy and use the 
initial contracts to keep wholesale power supplied at rates around US$ 30 per 
MWh, which was significantly below the system’s long term marginal 
expansion cost (around US$ 36-40 per MWh) or in other words below rates 
that would make new generation investments financially viable. The fact that 
the government squeezed generation margins was not immediately obvious 
because even with low wholesale rates federal GENCOS appeared to be 
making healthy profits (see Figure 3). While it could logically have been 
assumed that generation margins were more or less healthy, in reality 
GENCOS in Brazil benefited from the fact that much of their power was 
generated by hydroelectric plants whose capital costs had already been 
amortised, thus enabling them to operate profitably because of the low 
operating costs associated with hydroelectricity (around US$ 5 per MWh). New 
generation investment, be it in hydro or thermal power plants, would require 
much higher levels of remuneration and result in a much higher wholesale and 
retail rate for electricity. The government’s decision to squeeze generation 
margins thus handicapped private investment in new power generation 
facilities. 
A secondary effect of increasing distribution margins and the pressures 
that it created on electricity prices was that the government avoided measures 
which would have increased security of power supply because such measures 
would have increased average power prices even further. For example, capacity 
payments which remunerate investors for making stand-by generation plants 
available would have helped back-up hydropower during times of water 
scarcity. However, capacity payments were not implemented because they 
would have had to be tacked on to power rates as additionals, which would 
have raised average power rates even more.22  
Orthodox proponents of privatisation and liberalisation argue that the 
government’s reluctance in allowing prices to rise to what a liberalised market 
                                                 
22 Such capacity payments were finally instituted after the power rationing of 2001 and 
added to retail rates. 
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would have established is one important reason that electricity privatisation 
failed, thus blaming the incompleteness of the Cardoso administration’s policy 
reforms for the eventual rationing.23 The Brazilian case thus appears to provide 
an empirical confirmation of Vernon’s concept of the obsolescing bargain 
wherein the government, once investors are committed with heavy sunk costs, 
proceeds to expropriate their earnings by restraining prices the firms are 
allowed to charge.24 
This argument is factually plausible but it ignores the economic 
backdrop to electricity sector reforms in Brazil: Higher electricity rates would 
feed right back into the macroeconomic problem of inflation, which was what 
the economic stabilisation plans were focused on. It was not so much that 
rampant rate increases would create a populist backlash that deterred the 
administration from allowing larger increases in electricity rates. It was that the 
electricity rate increases and the economic policies were having a severe 
negative impact on economic growth and forcing an adverse reaction from the 
very policy constituencies within the administration that were pushing for 
privatisation and liberalisation. In response to the unfolding economic crisis, a 
faction from Cardoso’s own party even tried to have the Finance Minister and 
the Central Bank president replaced and did succeed in removing the latter.25  
The disagreements over how to limit the electricity rate increases also 
weakened some of the critical institutions associated with the privatisation 
power sector. As electricity rates rose, the Treasury, which was pushing 
privatisation, began to pressure the electric power regulatory agency, ANEEL, 
to find ways to control the increase in electricity rates. In turn, ANEEL began 
to lose credibility because it was unable to find appropriate solutions to 
maintaining the regulatory contract and facilitating private investment while 
keeping electricity rates in check. The internal discord within the 
administration became so strong—at one point Cardoso wanted to fire the 
president of ANEEL—that ANEEL complained that its activities should be 
restricted solely to regulation and that it should not be responsible for 
developing power sector policies or issuing licenses for new plants. 
In the end, government efforts to control electricity rates increased 
perceptions of policy risk of earnings appropriation. This translated into lower 
levels of private investment in generation as investors waited to see how the 
administration intended to resolve the internal contradiction in its reform plans 
of trying to control prices while increasing investment.26 The lower levels of 
private investment combined with the curtailing of federal GENCO 
investments made power supply markets tighter, with the resultant scarcity 
                                                 
23 Gall, ‘Apagão Politica Energetica’; Greiner, ‘Soluções ao Inves de mais Confução’. 
24 See Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US 
Enterprises, (New York 1971). 
25 J. de Onis, ‘Brazil’s New Capitalism’, Foreign Affairs, (May-June 2000). 
26 See R. Colitt, ‘Power Supply Running Dry’, Financial Times, (20 July 2001); G. Dyer, 
‘Energy Crisis puts Country in Political Spin’, Financial Times, (20 July 2001); and 
Global Power Report, ‘Brazil Developers Dismiss Proposed $ 29.40/MWh Ceiling on 
Gas Generation’, 28 May 1999. 
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itself creating additional pressures on wholesale electricity rates. Rather than 
the expected virtuous cycle, Brazilian power reforms became trapped in a 
vicious cycle.  
Privatisation was thus internally contradictory and short-lived. It 
required massive increases in public utility prices, which the government was 
able to accept to only a limited extent, and when the economy’s ability to 
absorb price increases reached its limit, government reactions made further 
private investment unviable.  
The False Promise of Liberalisation 
Let us now turn our attention to one of the main criticisms of the Brazilian 
power reforms, which is that liberalisation was not carried far enough. A more 
sophisticated approach to privatisation argues that efficiency gains and 
corresponding benefits for consumers accrue not so much from privatisation 
as from accompanying market liberalisation and competition.27 However, 
wholesale power market liberalisation and the putative efficiency gains ascribed 
to it would not have improved the fragile equation according to which the 
industry was being privatised. Wholesale prices in Brazil could be controlled to 
some extent without bankrupting the power companies because a large 
proportion of the power was being produced by hydroelectric plants whose 
capital costs had already been amortised. By mixing the amortised and other 
energy, average electricity rates were lower than the market-clearing rates. The 
market liberalisation that was being proposed, which was based on the model 
which was then operational in Great Britain, would mean that average power 
prices earned by all power plants would automatically gravitate towards the 
much higher market-clearing prices that are determined by the marginal costs 
of new generation plants. A federal commission later (after the rationing) 
estimated that liberalising the market would lead to a doubling of wholesale 
power rates, from about R$ 40.7 per MWh to R$ 92.1 per MWh and, as a 
consequence, average retail prices would increase from R$ 124 per MWh to R$ 
170 per MWh over the same period.28 Given the enormous difference in the 
costs of the amortised hydroelectric plants and the proposed new sources of 
electricity, any static efficiency gains that market liberalisation would bring 
would be too low to compensate for this windfall profit and price increase. 
Any potential dynamic efficiency gains, which might or might not push 
market-clearing prices to such low levels, would in any case be realised much 
too far in the future to have compensatory effects within the time-frame 
required by the Real Plan.  
Although the presence of cheap power from amortised hydroelectric 
plants contributed greatly to complicating Brazilian wholesale power market 
                                                 
27 George Yarrow, ‘A Theory of Privatization, or Why Bureaucrats are Still in 
Business’, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999), pp. 157-168.  
28 Ministério de Minas e Energia, Comitê de Revitilização do Modelo do Setor 
Elétrico, Relatório de Progresso No. 2, (Brasilia 2002). 
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liberalisation, studies from other countries have shown that even in the 
absence of such unique circumstances, power market privatisation and 
liberalisation tend not to simultaneously promote price reductions and security 
of supply. In some cases, such as in California, the problem with power 
markets was driven by a dynamic opposite to that in Brazil: Stranded assets in 
the form of relatively expensive power plants built under regulatory regimes 
which guaranteed them a specified rate of return being then required to 
compete in a deregulated market. 29 
Lost in Translation: The Fragility of the Brazilian 
Privatisation Strategy 
The Brazilian power reforms were essentially fragile and, like the country’s Real 
Plan, based on the gamble that assuming certain costs and risks in the short 
term would provide the economic stability and growth which would carry the 
industry to a stable equilibrium. However, the stability-based growth cycle that 
the Real and privatisation plans anticipated was not sustainable, to a large 
extent because it was too expensive, in terms of both the interest payments 
required to maintain the value of the Real and the high post-privatisation utility 
rates. After several years, these high costs were not rewarded with increased 
credibility because investors withdrew massively in the wake of the Asian and 
Russian financial crises. The government was no longer able to maintain the 
currency peg which was, in effect, covering up the fact that utility rates had 
been pushed to very high levels. The subsequent and inevitable devaluation 
ensured that such high utility rates could not be maintained and the 
privatisation programme collapsed under the weight of its own needs.  
The idea that the Real Plan’s stability would help pay down the debt 
also failed. The interest rates necessary to maintain the currency peg became so 
expensive, sometimes exceeding 50 per cent for some short-term debt, that in 
the end the Real Plan resulted in a net outflow of resources from the Treasury 
and a 77 per cent increase in the national debt (see Figure 6). 
In this chaotic economic situation issues that were identified as 
implementation problems were actually symptoms of a combination of policies 
intended to promote privatisation and of coping mechanisms in the face of a  
Figure 6 
Brazil Net Debt 
                                                 
29 While a more in-depth approach to the weaknesses of power markets is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the interested reader may refer to the following sources: J.R. 
Branston, ‘A Counterfactual Price Analysis of British Electricity Privatisation’, Utilities 
Policy, Vol. 9 (2000), pp. 31-46; Chi-Keung Voo, ‘What Went Wrong in California’s 
Electricity Market’, Energy, Vol. 26 (2001), pp. 747-58; Ferdinand E. Banks, 
‘Economics of Electricity Deregulation and Privatization: An Introductory Survey’, 
Energy, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1996), pp. 249-61; Paul Joskow, ‘California's Electricity Crisis’, 
NBER Working Paper, No. 8842 (2001); David Newbery, ‘The Regulator's Review of 
the English Electricity Pool’, Utilities Policy, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1998), pp. 129-41. 
 28
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
% GDP
 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil 
 
privatisation policy that was tenuous and towards the end, rapidly failing. For 
example: (1) The failure to create a strong regulatory agency and clear market 
rules before beginning privatisation was motivated by the need to begin 
privatisation quickly to take advantage of favourable market and political 
conditions; (2) the government’s controls over electricity rates and its failure to 
liberalise the market were motivated by a desire to control rapid increases in 
electricity prices and the consequent inflationary pressures; and (3) the frequent 
policy changes at the margin resulted from the administration trying to balance 
investor interests with domestic economic concerns. Table 2 summarises some 
of the policy initiatives of the Brazilian electric power reforms which were 
criticised as implementation problems and shows how their underlying 
motivations were to try to make privatisation work. The table also explains the 
policies’ underlying assumptions and indicates where these assumptions were 
incorrect, thereby identifying how these policy initiatives became mis-translated 
and resulted in perverse outcomes quite different from what the administration 
had intended. 
5. FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE TYPE: THE 
PERFORMANCE AND EVOLUTION OF PRIVATISATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This paper has deliberately provided a detailed narrative in order to clearly 
identify policymakers’ rationales and the points of departure from the expected 
causal chain, and to provide sufficient detail to allow scholars to compare this 
with other cases.  It is usually problematic to generalise findings from even 
careful case-based empirical research but the failures of Brazilian power 
privatisation are not idiosyncratic. On the contrary, the general dynamics of the 
failure of stability-based privatisation programmes have been repeated in many 
other contexts in Latin America, most notably Argentina where the 
 29
implementation of power reforms was quite different and, in fact, for a long 
time considered optimal. For example, Argentina privatised generation first 
and ensured adequate competition by restricting the size of power companies. 
Nevertheless, electricity prices rose and the system collapsed after the Peso’s 
devaluation. While the stage at which privatisation failure becomes evident and 
the extent to which privatisation was conducted before its collapse has varied 
across countries, there are certain trends which are consistent.  
First, post-privatisation prices in developing countries have risen 
consistently.30 If private operators are supposed to continually improve 
efficiencies, post-privatisation prices for public services should show a falling 
trend  (after  adjusting  for  inflation),  which  in  most  sectors  other  than  in 
telecommunications they do not.31 Many studies point to cases in which 
privatisation resulted in reduced prices, but careful analysis of these cases, for 
example electricity privatisation in the UK and Argentina, and water 
privatisation in Buenos Aires, Argentina reveals that prices were increased 
substantially just before privatisation32 indicating that many of the oft-cited 
claims on price reductions through privatisations are spurious.  
Second, privatisation was supposed to unlock global private capital 
flows into developing country infrastructures. These flows were indeed 
substantial but still a small fraction of the public investment in the same 
period. In addition, not all of what is counted as private investment represents 
new sources of finance. In reality, post-privatisation investments have often 
used many of the same sources of funds as state-led investments such as 
multilateral aid agencies and even public funds. For example, about half of 
“private” investment in Brazilian electric power between 1995 and 2000 
actually came from BNDES loans channelled through private companies.33 
Third, and most critically, in developing countries privatisation in 
combination with other reforms was supposed to deliver strong and sustained 
economic growth. Indeed, the pragmatic privatisation thesis was that 
developing countries were privatising at one level to deal with immediate fiscal 
                                                 
30 See, for example in the electricity industry, H. Nagayama, ‘Effects of Regulatory 
Reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry on Electricity Prices in Developing 
Countries’, Energy Policy. (2007). 
31 David McKenzie, and Dilip Mookherjee, ‘Paradox and Perception: Evidence from 
Four Latin American Countries’, in Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (eds.) Privatization 
Reality Check: The Distributional Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries (Washington 
DC 2005). 
32 David Newbery and Micheal Pollitt, ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of 
Britain’s CEGB—Was it Worth It?’, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 45 (1997); J. 
Delfino, and A. Casarin, ‘The Reform of the Utilities Sector in Argentina’, WIDER 
discussion Paper No. 74 (2001); A. Loftus and D. McDonald, ‘Of Liquid Dreams: A 
Political Ecology of Water Privatization in Buenos Aires’, Environment and Urbanization, 
Vol. 13, No. 2 (2001); George Yarrow, ‘British Electricity Prices since Privatisation’,  
Research Report, Regulatory Policy Research Centre, Hertford College (Oxford 1992). 
33 BNDES (2001) O Apoio do BNDES ao Setor Elétrico. Informe Infra-estrutura, 
No. 52.  
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problems34 but more critical to the enthusiasm for privatisation was the belief 
that it and associated reforms would lead to higher rates of growth. 
Privatisation appears to have largely delivered on efficiency and productivity at 
the firm level in absolute terms35  but the more substantial claims of diffuse 
benefits to governments and customers have not been realised.36 Privatisation 
also appears to have been particularly weak in overcoming the heavy financial 
burdens imposed by broad structural reforms initiatives. 
Were Privatisation Failures Implementation Problems? 
The orthodox defence of privatisation tends to blame bad implementation for 
its failures. At the political or strategic level, it suggests that the policy 
environments within which privatisation programmes were implemented were 
inadequate to control rent-seeking and political interference, thereby 
dampening investor interest. It condemns policymakers for not being 
committed to privatisation and abandoning it once their initial interests in 
obtaining fiscal manoeuvring space were served. It also criticises policymakers 
for being timid and deserting reforms in the face of opposed agency from 
bureaucrats and public protests. Although orthodox analyses sometimes 
acknowledge that privatisation is poorly equipped to deal with the distributive 
conflicts which lead to public protest, more often they claim that (1) such 
conflicts may be more a result of politicking than actual conflict and (2) that 
the benefits of privatisation are still substantial and conflict could be avoided if 
these were better distributed through superior implementation.37 At the tactical 
level, the orthodoxy blames governments for instituting inadequate or flawed 
regulatory and market frameworks and insists that better designed policies 
                                                 
34 See Ravi Ramamurti, ‘Why are Developing Countries Privatizing?’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1992).  
35 See William Megginson and Jeffrey Netter, ‘From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39 (2001), 
pp. 321-389. 
36 Newbery and Pollitt, ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain’s CEGB—Was 
it Worth It?’ 
37 Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis, ‘Privatization Reality Check: Distributional Effects 
in Developing Countries’, in Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (eds.), Privatization Reality 
Check: The Distributional Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries (Washington DC 
2005). 
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would have averted privatisation failures.38  A common conclusion of these 
literatures and approaches is that privatisation programmes fell victim not so 
much to strategic flaws but rather to not enough attention being paid to 
preparation and implementation, especially in their institutional aspects. 
Consequently, such analyses argue and exhort that privatisation should neither 
be abandoned nor reversed; instead efforts to privatise correctly should be 
strengthened.39 This literature does argue for building up state capacity, but 
only so far as to support privatisation, and does not even consider how 
devoting the same amount of resources to the public sector might improve 
publicly owned utility performance. 
Many of these analyses are empirically flimsy. The claim that 
governments were fickle and prematurely abandoned privatisation is 
contradicted by empirical research that goes beyond merely checking whether 
privatisation was continued or not. In the Brazilian case, for example, the fact 
that the government did not renege on their contractual obligations until after 
the rationing and insisted on ploughing public financial resources into private 
firms through the PPT in order to stimulate private investment in the power 
industry implies that the administration was not arbitrarily confiscating private 
investors’ returns but rather trying to make a difficult policy work. It was not 
only in Brazil that privatisation initially enjoyed substantial and broad political 
support and where policy inconsistencies and opposition followed rather than 
preceded privatisation failures.40 The wider empirical research suggests a more 
                                                 
38 A volume edited by Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, for example, 
concludes that efficiency and wages generally increased through privatisation and that 
increases in prices and monopoly power should only be blamed on bad regulation. 
See, Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (eds.), Privatization in Latin 
America: Myths and Reality (Palo Alto 2005).  The book also accuses the Brazilian 
government of losing the opportunity to pay down the federal debt with privatisation 
proceeds, which completely ignores the fact that it was the high interest payments 
necessary to maintain the currency peg which was responsible for the increase in the 
national debt and that applying privatisation proceeds to reducing the debt would 
have a negligible effect in comparison.  
39 See Ioannis Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation and Competition, 
(Washington DC 2004) and Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, ‘An Assessment of 
Privatization’, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2004), pp. 87-118. 
40 See Leslie Elliot Armijo and Phillipe Faucher, ‘We Have a Consensus: Explaining 
Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin America, Latin American Politics and 
Society, Vol. 44, No, 2 (2002), pp. 1-40, in which the authors argue that reforms were 
supported by both the elite and the masses. Similarly, Volker Schneider, Simon Fink 
and Marc Tenbucken, ‘Buying out the State: A Comparative Perspective on the 
Privatization of Infrastructures’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 6 (2007), pp. 
704-27, find that veto players and corporatist interest groups were insignificant 
barriers to privatisation and Glen Biglaiser and David S. Brown, ‘The Determinants of 
Economic Liberalization in Latin America’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4 
(2005), pp. 671-80, conclude that opposed domestic political factors institutions did 
not systematically prejudice reform. 
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generalised pattern where policy related troubles followed rather than 
instigated privatisation failures.  
Under such circumstances where both governments and investors want 
to continue with privatisation and private investment, an explanation more 
plausible than the obsolescing bargain is that privatisation policies were not 
providing either party their minimum required payoff. From the governments’ 
point of view, prices for public services were increasing uncontrollably. In 
Brazil, a trade journal highlighted the fact that retail electricity rates in Rio de 
Janeiro had begun to exceed those charged in California or Paris.41 From the 
investors’ point of view, their earnings were insufficient to compensate their 
risk adjusted costs of capital. A recent study of the returns of privatised 
DISCOS in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States finds that the 
average return on capital for Brazilian DISCOS was consistently below their 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). However, the actual returns to 
power investors in Brazil have, except for the turbulent years of 1998-2000, 
consistently exceeded the returns to electric power investors in the United 
States.42 Yet, the Brazilian investments were considered unattractive because, 
given investors’ perceptions of risk in Brazil; the WACC for power 
investments was around 14 per cent as opposed to 6 per cent for power 
investments in the United States. Clearly then, if investors demands are to be 
satisfied in a capital intensive industry such as electric power, Brazilian 
consumers are forced to pay a higher price for electricity than their US 
counterparts. Thus, neither the governments nor the investors were able to 
satisfy their primary interests through privatisation. The domestic economy 
was incapable of meeting investor demands over the long-term and investors 
were unable and unwilling to supply investment at the prices that the domestic 
economy could sustain. 
The Generalised Pattern of Privatisation Failure 
In general, privatisation passes through three phases. Its initial phase, of 
courtship and honeymoon, is characterised by mutual accommodation. 
Privatisation works at this stage because both governments and investors are 
willing to pay high prices and take risks in order to demonstrate their 
commitment to and credibility of their stated positions. For their part, 
governments enter into politically painful structural readjustment programmes, 
pay high interest rates to maintain currency stability and allow substantial 
increases in the prices for public services in order to provide investors the high 
returns that their risky investments require. In return, investors undertake large 
sunk investments in politically-risky environments. Substantial financial flows 
accrue to this mutual accommodation, simulating the domestic economies in 
the short term and reinforcing the reforms. 
                                                 
41 C. Tautz, ‘O Injusto Preço da Energia no Brasil’, Brasil Energia, No. 248 (July 2001). 
42 Katia Rocha, Fernando Camcho and Gabriela Bragança, ‘Return on Capital of 
Brazilian Electricity Distributors: A Comparative Analysis’, Energy Policy, Vol. 25 
(2007), pp. 2526-37. 
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In the second, critical, phase privatisation programmes confront reality, 
disenchantment and misunderstanding. During this phase, reforms are 
expected to consolidate themselves. Governments expect investors to begin 
rewarding their commitment to reform by undertaking larger investments, 
increasing efficiencies, reducing their risk premiums and lowering the real costs 
of public services. Investors, having committed billions of dollars to 
purchasing government assets are however interested in first recouping their 
investments by repatriating high levels of initial earnings, and in testing 
whether governments’ commitments to reforms will endure. In the meantime, 
the efficiency dividend, though significant, does not yield any real price 
benefits to customers because investors capture most of the accrued gains. 
During this period, the initial economic surge also abates as overvalued 
domestic currencies, high domestic interest rates and high public service prices 
increase domestic production costs and render domestic producers less 
competitive in both internal and external markets. In this environment, 
governments’ efforts to protect and maintain economic competitiveness and 
restart growth by limiting further increases in public service prices are 
interpreted by investors as manifestations of the obsolescing bargain wherein 
governments are again acting capriciously and confiscating investor earnings. 
In response, they limit their investments and began to pressure governments to 
compensate them for their losses in currency markets. The implementation 
problems such as troublesome market rules which are often cited as the cause 
of privatisation failures are, under these circumstances, marginal impediments 
to privatisation and private investment. In most cases where they are cited, the 
effects of these barriers are to somehow limit further increases to already-high 
prices for public services, which is exactly what the governments want and 
need to do for broader economic strategy reasons. More than implementation 
problems and a lack of mutual credibility, mutual incompatibility of the two 
actors’ primary interests within the instable economic environment derail 
privatisation programmes. 
In the final phase, depending upon the severity of the economic 
turmoil and the level of mutual distrust that has accumulated in the previous 
phase, the outcomes range from acrimonious separation to uneasy coexistence. 
In some cases, investors abandon their concessions and try, generally 
unsuccessfully, to recover damages from arbitration panels. In other cases, 
investors continue to operate their concessions, but under more restrictive 
pricing environments. Private investment in most infrastructures falls 
dramatically in this period and governments are once again forced to reassume 
primary responsibility for expanding infrastructure services. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented in this paper arbitrates between the strategy versus 
implementation failure hypotheses and concludes that while elements of both 
strategy and implementation failure were present in the Brazilian power 
privatisation case, the effect of the former dominated and generated the latter 
failure. Policies that were meant to facilitate and consolidate privatisation had 
become lost in translation. Supporting the Real Plan required large inflows of 
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foreign exchange, which the administration tried to ensure by raising investors’ 
potential profits. This did facilitate DISCO privatisation but at the same time 
made investment in generation unattractive because it forced the government 
to squeeze generation margins in order to prevent electricity rates from 
climbing too high. The withdrawal of federal investment was expected to signal 
that the government was serious about privatisation and bolster investor 
confidence. Instead, the curtailing of public investments at a critical juncture 
translated into tighter markets that lessened the government’s manoeuvring 
space to adopt more strategic power sector policies. In many instances, what 
would be classified as implementation failures were actually coping 
mechanisms intended to deal with distortions generated by policies that were 
failing their own logic. Better implementation of the same policies would have 
done little to lessen the magnitude of the failure and the resultant losses to the 
Brazilian power industry and the general economy. 
Brazilian power reforms failed because they were fragile and their 
success relied greatly on a number of favourable assumptions which were in 
reality quite uncertain. The first assumption was that the initial economic 
stability provided by the Real Plan could be sustained (partly by the country’s 
privatisation programme) providing the economic growth which would 
compensate over time the high costs that the country was incurring to ensure 
that stability. In the initial stages privatisation worked because both 
government and investors underestimated potential risks and overestimated 
potential profitability and efficiency gains.  This strategy fell apart when the 
delicate balance upon which they operated was upset by the financial crises 
that spread from Asia and Russia to Latin America. The second assumption 
was that there was a treasure trove of efficiency waiting to accrue to 
privatisation and that this would ameliorate the distortions that the stability-
focussed privatisation programmes were creating. In reality, the efficiency gains 
from privatisation were substantial but insufficient to compensate for the costs 
imposed by the stability-promoting strategies within which it was embedded. 
What the Brazilian electric power case has demonstrated, and what other 
privatisation cases appear to indicate, is that the theorising favouring 
privatisation is often bolstered by untenable assumptions about 
implementation dynamics and that much has been lost in the translation from 
theory to application. 
